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Abstract: We analyze the relation between capital structure, ownership 
structure, and corporate value for a sample of 1,216 firms from 15 
European countries. Our results stress two different conflicts of interest and 
show the differential role played by the mechanisms of corporate control 
depending on the legal and institutional environment. In common law 
countries, as a consequence of the relationships between managers and 
shareholders, capital structure and managerial ownership are the most 
effective mechanisms of control. In civil law countries, however, as a 
consequence of the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, 
the ownership concentration and the sharing of control within the firm 
become crucial. In this scenario, the second reference shareholder plays a 
critical role in contesting the control of the dominant largest shareholder in 
order to reduce the extraction of private benefits and improve the firm’s 
performance. 
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In recent years, many papers have analyzed the effect on a firm’s 
value of some mechanisms of corporate control (Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
This literature has often emphasized the specific characteristics of each 
country and has shown a heterogeneous functioning of control mechanisms 
depending on the legal and institutional setting.  
According to this international approach of corporate governance 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003; Mintz, 2005), the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms may be affected by the relationships within the firms and how 
the rights of stakeholders are protected in each country. While the 
managers-shareholders relationship is the main source of conflicts in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, the ownership concentration originates a new 
conflict of interest in civil law countries. In these countries, the ownership 
concentration facilitates the expropriation of wealth from the small 
shareholders by the largest shareholders. In this case, a second reference 
shareholder1 can contest the control of the main shareholder, reduce the 
potential for expropriation and impact positively on the firm’s value. 
Our paper adds to this literature and aims to analyze the differential 
effect of some mechanisms of corporate control across countries according 
to the legal characteristics and to the investor protection in each country. 
To some extent, our paper could contribute to a “contingency theory” of 
corporate governance, as we show that the functioning of some corporate 
governance mechanisms is contingent upon the quality and origin of a 
country’s legal institutions. Our findings show that while manager 
ownership and firm debt are the most effective mechanisms in the Anglo-
Saxon firms, the distribution of ownership and control among shareholders 
is a crucial mechanism in the Continental European firms. 
The role played by a second reference shareholder is the keystone of 
our paper. Whereas much of the literature has focused on the stake and the 
identity of the largest shareholder, we still know little about the influence 
of a second reference shareholder or how they interact with the largest one 
to improve the performance of the firm. Our results show that both the 
existence of a second reference shareholder and his stake are significant 
issues in most Continental European firms. This finding stresses the 
importance of the coalitions of control among shareholders, and the 
distribution of power inside the coalitions. 
The relevance of our results is twofold. First, for academia and experts 
in corporate governance, we suggest that the inclusion of the legal and 
institutional setting could significantly improve the validity of the research. 
Second, for policymakers, we suggest that reports and codes of good 
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governance should explicitly consider the institutional framework of the 
country, since the mere implementation of good practises from other 
countries risks being ineffective.  
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 analyzes previous 
research into the mechanisms of corporate control and formulates the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the sample and variables used, 
and we explain the empirical method. Section 4 shows the empirical results 
and we assess the degree to which the initial hypotheses are verified. In the 
final section some conclusions are drawn from the most outstanding results 
and some directions for future research are suggested. 
2. Institutional framework and corporate governance 
As some authors have suggested, corporate governance aims to solve 
the core problem of compensation to investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Denis, 2001). In this scenario, the legal protection of investors becomes a 
key factor in assessing the influence of the control mechanisms and, 
consequently, corporate governance interacts with the legal and 
institutional framework (Mayer, 1998). 
There are a number of other institutional factors with a profound 
impact upon matters of corporate governance. Some studies have analyzed 
how strong a country’s informational regime is, including the leading role 
of business analysts (Khanna and Palepu, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004), 
the influence of business schools and management education in enacting 
agency-like behavior (Ghoshal, 2005), and the political orientation of a 
country’s ruling elite (Roe, 2003). Although we focus on the legal factors 
of the institutional matrix, there are other institutional factors that could 
also play a decisive role with respect to the efficacy of corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
The so-called law and finance approach is based on the legal tradition 
of each country, according to which, countries could be divided into two 
groups: common law countries and civil law countries. While the law is 
made by judges in common law countries, legal scholars play a prominent 
role in civil law countries. Common law countries are basically Anglo-
Saxon nations, whereas civil law countries are from Western Europe. (La 
Porta et al. 1997, 1998 and 2000; Levine, 1998; Levine et al. 2000; 
Emmons and Schmid, 2000). 
Legal tradition is important due to the different legal protection of 
investors. Investors’ rights are better protected in common law countries. 
The varying degree of legal protection means ownership structures (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Himmelberg et al., 2002), corporate finance decisions 
(La Porta et al., 2000) and development of the banking sector (Levine, 
1998) are all different. 
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO “NUEVAS TENDENCIAS EN DIRECCIÓN DE EMPRESAS” DT 01/07 
http://www3.uva.es/empresa/documentos.php  http://ideas.repec.org/s/ntd/wpaper.html  
-3- 
The legal and institutional features are not unrelated to the agency 
problems within firms. There are two conflicts of interest to which most 
attention has been paid: the relationship between managers and firm 
owners and the relation between shareholders and creditors. Nevertheless, 
in recent years there is more concern with the conflict of interest between 
large and small minority shareholders. As stated by Becht and Röell (1999) 
and Bianco and Casavola (1999), in the Anglo-Saxon common law 
countries, the main agency problem arises from the dispersion of corporate 
ownership and from a certain lack of shareholder activism. On the contrary, 
the main problem in civil law countries is the too high concentration of 
ownership and, consequently, large shareholders may use their voting 
power to extract private benefits from small shareholders. An alternative 
view of these agency problems is the existence of a general conflict 
between managers and all shareholders (more frequent in common law 
countries) and an agency problem between managers and small 
shareholders, because managers collude with large blockholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders (civil law countries). 
In turn, the mechanisms of corporate control will play a different role 
in each institutional and legal environment. Let us review some of the most 
usual mechanisms and, at the same time, formulate our five hypotheses. 
The mechanisms we study are basically internal: capital structure and 
ownership structure, although we consider two different issues in the latter 
-the influence of ownership concentration and managerial ownership.  
2.1. Capital structure 
Due to the separation between ownership and control, managers’ 
decisions can be driven by perquisites consumption (Jensen, 1986). 
Relative to equity, debt financing can enhance managerial discipline by 
reducing the free cash flow and other inefficient managerial actions 
(Grossman and Hart, 1982; Harris and Raviv, 1991; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1995). 
Therefore, one can expect a positive relation between corporate value 
–as a consequence of the managers’ efficient decisions- and financial 
leverage. Although debt might also be used to reduce the expropriation of 
minority shareholders (de la Bruslerie, 2003), capital structure reinforces 
the control over managers, and therefore a clearer effect of debt could be 
expected in common law countries, since the problems arising from the 
managerial relation are most severe in those countries. Consequently, our 
first hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: A positive relation is expected between corporate 
debt and the firm’s value. This relation will be more important in 
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common law countries, where the problem of separating 
ownership and control is more patent. 
2.2. Managerial ownership 
Previous empirical evidence shows an unequivocal relation between 
managerial ownership and the firm’s value (Morck et al., 1989; Thomsen 
and Pedersen, 2000). This close link is not a monotonous relationship, 
since it may combine a convergence effect at lower levels of managerial 
ownership with an entrenchment effect at higher levels of manager 
ownership. In coherence with this evidence, our results are therefore 
expected to show an initially positive effect of managerial ownership. Once 
a certain level of ownership is reached, this trend switches so that a 
negative impact of managerial ownership is likely to arise. 
Once again, the effect of this mechanism depends on the agency 
problem it is supposed to solve. For this reason, managerial ownership 
should play a more important role in common law countries -where the 
most prominent agency problem is the conflict between external 
uninformed shareholders and managers- than in civil law countries. Hence, 
our second hypothesis may be stated as follows:  
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s value should keep a non-linear 
relationship with managerial ownership: a positive relation for 
low levels of ownership and a negative one for high levels of 
ownership. This relation will be stronger in common law 
countries. 
2.3. Concentration of ownership 
As a consequence of poor investor protection, corporate ownership 
concentration is higher in the civil law countries. Then, in firms with quite 
a concentrated ownership structure, a conflict of interest arises between 
large and small shareholders (Burkart et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1999). In 
contrast, in common law countries, investors’ rights are more effectively 
protected, and ownership is widely held. As a consequence of this structure 
and the problem of the free-rider2, shareholders in these countries have few 
incentives to monitor managerial actions and delegate in the market for 
corporate control (Franks and Mayer, 1997). In fact, high ownership 
concentration has been proved to encourage manager monitoring and to 
improve firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Bergström and 
Rydqvist, 1990). 
Yet, once again, this relationship must be analyzed in connection with 
the legal and institutional features. Where investors are best protected 
against managerial discretional decisions, ownership concentration may not 
have any significant influence on the firm’s value because shareholders do 
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not need concentrated ownership structures in order to have their rights 
protected3. The absence of a significant relation for common law countries 
could even arise as the result of two countervailing effects: a disciplinary 
role of ownership concentration (in a similar vein as leverage works) which 
increases firms’ performance, and a negative impact due to the problems 
between large and small shareholders (although less important than in civil 
law countries). 
On the contrary, when the conflict between large and small 
shareholders is more outstanding, ownership concentration favours a 
potential risk of expropriation4. The wider the decision-making ability of 
majority shareholders is, the higher the risk of expropriation becomes 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Gutiérrez and Tribó, 2004). Nonetheless, the 
possibility of expropriation may present a non-linear effect, since beyond a 
certain level of ownership, large shareholders bear the costs of their actions 
to a greater degree and thus the private benefits they may hope to extract 
will be smaller (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2001; Claessens et al., 2000). Thus the risk of expropriation is the result of 
a dual relation between the firm’s value and the level of ownership of the 
controlling shareholders: a decreasing relationship at lower levels of 
ownership and a positive one for higher levels of the largest shareholder’s 
ownership. All these reasons allow our third hypothesis to be formulated as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The ownership concentration will play a role that 
depends on the legal and institutional environment. In the civil 
law countries a non-linear effect might be found, combining a 
negative relation between ownership concentration and firm 
value at lower levels of ownership with a positive relation for 
high enough levels of ownership held by large shareholders. In 
the common law countries, the chances are that there is no 
significant relation. 
There are also other factors, such as the influence of large shareholders 
other than the largest one, that may influence the alignment of interests or 
the expropriation of wealth between shareholders. In firms with multiple 
blockholders, these large shareholders interact, so that there is no longer a 
sole shareholder who controls the firm and controlling coalitions must be 
formed. 
The influence of a second reference shareholder is twofold. On the one 
hand, the second blockholder can form a controlling coalition with the 
largest shareholder to share diverted profit and, hence, to reduce the 
performance of the firm. But, on the other hand, the blockholder has 
incentives to monitor the largest shareholder, reducing profit diversion and 
improving the value of the firm. The question we should pose concerns the 
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conditions under which the diversion of profits can be higher in firms with 
more than one blockholder than in firms with a single blockholder (Maury 
and Pajuste, 2005). 
Regarding the first effect, the mere existence of a second reference 
shareholder allows him to collude with the largest shareholder to extract 
private benefits, as suggested by Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000). 
Furthermore, the bargaining problems between the two largest shareholders 
may result in a kind of corporate paralysis, reducing the firm’s efficiency 
and hurting the minority shareholders as well.  
Bearing in mind that the conflict between large vs. small shareholders 
is more severe in civil law countries than in common law countries, we 
formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: The presence of a second reference shareholder 
will negatively affect a firm’s value in the civil law countries. 
As far as the second effect is concerned, recent research has shown 
that a firm’s value is positively affected by the ability to challenge the 
largest shareholder (Bloch and Hege, 2001; Gomes and Novaes, 2005; 
Edwards and Weichenrieder, 2002). The expropriation of minority 
shareholders is less common in companies where control is most contested 
and where large shareholders’ stakes are not very different, so they have to 
compete/cooperate for corporate control.  
 When the main shareholder does not have a dominant position, he 
needs to form coalitions with other reference shareholders or with a number 
of minority shareholders. This shared control moderates the discretion of 
large shareholders and reduces the private benefits they might extract. To 
some extent, sharing control is a compromise between the excessive 
monitoring of an outside investor who does not internalize the private 
benefits, and the excessive discretion of an unchecked controlling 
shareholder. Likewise, increases in the stake of the second blockholder also 
increase the expropriating costs that the controlling coalition internalizes. 
Accordingly, the value of the firm should have a positive relation with the 
ability of the second reference shareholder to contest the largest 
shareholder by taking part in the controlling coalition, i.e., with their stake.  
In addition, sharing control is likely to protect minority shareholders 
regardless of a court’s ability to detect conflicts of interest in business 
decisions (Gomes and Novaes, 2005). This means that the effect of sharing 
control should prevail in countries with the weakest legal protection and 
law enforceability such as civil law countries. All this leads to our final 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 5: The percentage of ownership owned by the second 
largest shareholder will positively affect a firm’s value in the 
civil law countries. 
3. Sample and Methodology 
3.1. Sample and variables 
In order to test our hypotheses, we have combined two databases: 
financial information and firms’ market value have been obtained from 
Compustat, whereas the information on ownership structure has been 
drawn from Amadeus5. The sample, as detailed in Table 1, includes 1,216 
companies from fifteen countries of the European Union between 1997-
2000, amounting to a total of 3,115 observations. 
(Insert Table 1) 
We have defined a number of variables to measure the above 
mentioned issues. A firm’s value has been measured through the firm’s 
market to book value ratio (MB). According to Maury and Pajuste (2005), 
the firm’s market value has been defined as the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book value of debt. The capital structure has been measured 
by the debt-to-equity ratio (LEV). 
As for ownership structure, three aspects have been defined: 
managerial ownership, ownership concentration and the features of the 
second shareholder. Managerial ownership has been proxied by the 
percentage of shares held by the directors (DIR). Ownership concentration 
has been measured by the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder (PROP1). As for the second shareholder, two variables have 
been defined: a dummy variable (OWNDUM2) and a continuous variable 
(PROP2), aimed at introducing, respectively, the existence of a second 
reference shareholder and the proportion of ownership in the hands of this 
second largest shareholder. 
We have also introduced some control variables which, although they 
are not strict mechanisms of corporate governance, their omission could 
bias the results. Firstly, dividend policy (DIV) defined as the dividend 
payout ratio. Secondly, the size of the firm through the log of total assets 
(LOGAST). The sample can be divided into two groups according to the 
legal tradition (Table 1). 
3.2. Methodology 
The empirical analysis can be divided into two steps. The first stage is 
a descriptive analysis aimed at exploring differences in governance 
structures and their impact on market value in each institutional framework. 
In the second stage we test the five hypotheses with an explanatory analysis 
to assess to what extent the control mechanisms help to solve the agency 
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problems and thus affect the firm’s value. We end this explanatory analysis 
with some robustness checks of our results to alternative specifications of 
the model.  
Our database combines time series with cross-sectional data allowing 
the formation of panel data. Our estimations are conducted through the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), a specific panel data procedure 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). GMM has two advantages. First, it controls for 
the so-called unobservable constant heterogeneity, as represented by the 
fixed-effects term ηi, which refers to the specific characteristics of each 
firm that remain constant over time. Second, it allows the possible 
problems of endogeneity6 to be dealt with. The consistency of GMM 
estimates depends critically on the absence of second-order serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals and on the validity of the instruments. For 
this reason, Tables 5-7 report the Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions that checks the validity of the selected instruments, and auto(2), 
a second-order serial correlation test.  
Our model can be expressed as follows where i equals each individual 
and t equals time; ηi is the fixed-effects term for each individual and εit is 
the random error for each observation.  
MBit = β0  + β1 LEVit + β2  DIRit + β3  DIRit2  + β4 PROP1it 
+ β5  PROP1it2  + β6 OWNDUM2 + β7 PROP2 + β8 DIVit + 
β9 LOGASTit + ηi + it (1) 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive analysis  
Table 2 displays the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and 
minimum value of the most characteristic variables. To explore whether 
firms in common law countries show differences from those in civil law 
countries, the mean values are split into two groups according to LAW. 
Table 2 also shows the p-value or maximum level of significance to reject 
the null hypothesis of equality of means. The p-value clearly shows very 
significant differences between both legal traditions.
(Insert Table 2) 
As regards the valuation of companies, MB shows a significantly 
higher value in common law countries, consistent with La Porta et al. 
(1997 and 2002). This underlines the importance of investor protection in 
the functioning of capital markets.  
Concerning the ownership structure, civil law firms exhibit higher 
ownership concentration (PROP1 and PROP2), consistent with Franks and 
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Mayer (1997)7. Regarding financial decisions, civil law firms are 
significantly more financially leveraged and pay out less dividends than 
common law firms, which agrees with La Porta et al. (2000) and Giannetti 
(2003). Therefore, as a very preliminary intuition, our data reinforces the 
idea of two different capital and ownership structures conditional upon the 
legal and institutional environment.  
One concern about our model, as it stands in equation (1), is the 
possible multicollinearity problem. Accordingly, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is performed, a multicollinearity test, whose results are 
reported in Table 3, along with the coefficients of correlation between 
variables8. The closer the VIF is to one, the lower the degree of 
multicollinearity is. As can be seen, VIF is so close to one in all the cases 
that the absence of multicollinearity can be accepted. 
(Insert Table 3) 
In Table 4 the sample is split on the basis of the ownership held by the 
two largest reference shareholders.  Our purpose is to test whether the 
firm’s value can be affected by the presence of a second largest 
shareholder. The theoretical underlying reason is that the cooperation of 
this second reference shareholder is outstanding when the main shareholder 
owns less than 50% of the voting rights but, at the same time, the 
combination of the stakes of the first and second reference shareholders 
exceeds 50% of the ownership. In Table 4, we provide the average MB 
value when PROP1 is under 50% and we decompose the value depending 
on whether PROP1 plus PROP2 is under or over 50%. As can be seen, in 
both legal settings the average value of the firms in which the two largest 
shareholders own more than 50% is higher than the value of the firms in 
which the two largest shareholders do not achieve 50% of the ownership 
rights (3.03 against 2.68 and 3.48 against 3.12). This suggests that the 
second shareholder plays a counterbalancing role against the power of the 
largest shareholder, reduces his private benefits and improves the firm’s 
value when the first shareholder needs the second one to achieve the 
controlling majority. Furthermore, capital markets react positively to the 
idea of majority control when such control involves the cooperation of two 
large shareholders, relying on the moderating role of a second reference 
shareholder. 
(Insert Table 4) 
Therefore, although the results obtained so far are not conclusive, the 
descriptive analysis corroborates significant differences in terms of 
ownership structure between the countries from different legal origins. In 
addition, there seems to be a positive effect of a second reference 
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shareholder on the firm’s value since he may reduce the problems of 
majority control by a single dominant owner. 
4.2. Explanatory analysis 
The results of our first estimation are reported in Table 5. These 
results highlight the unequal relation between debt and the firm’s value: 
while it is significant and positive for common law firms, it is not 
significant for the civil law ones. This confirms hypothesis 1, according to 
which financial leverage has a positive influence on the firm’s value by 
acting as a disciplinary mechanism upon management and favouring the 
alignment of interests in the common law setting. By contrast, there is no 
significant relationship between corporate debt and the firm’s market value 
in civil law countries. These results could be explained on the basis of the 
different agency problems in each environment: corporate debt plays a 
more important role in the Anglo-Saxon countries due to its disciplining 
effect upon managers. 
(Insert Table 5) 
The results shown in Table 5 also support hypothesis 2. Managerial 
ownership (DIR) has a positive and significant effect on common law 
countries. This corroborates the idea that managerial ownership allows the 
alignment of interests in the countries where the most prominent conflict 
arises between directors and the owners of the firm. Likewise, the negative 
and significant coefficient for DIR2 points at a non-linear relationship, so 
that an entrenchment effect arises for high levels of managerial ownership, 
and this leads to a lower value of the firm.9 On the contrary, we do not find 
any significant effect for civil law firms. Although this last result deviates 
from previous research (de Miguel et al., 2004), once again, it can be 
explained on the basis of the different agency problems in each legal 
system: in civil law countries there is less separation between ownership 
and control, and therefore, the managerial ownership is not such a 
necessary control mechanism. 
As regards hypothesis 3, the insignificant coefficients of PROP1 and 
PROP12 do not lend support to ownership concentration as a mechanism of 
control in either of the two corporate systems. This seemingly conflicting 
result requires more detailed discussion and additional results that will be 
introduced below. 
As far as the impact of the second shareholder is concerned 
(OWNDUM2 and PROP2), the results show an asymmetric effect as 
predicted in hypothesis 4: whereas, in civil law countries, the mere 
existence of a second reference shareholder has a negative influence, in 
common law countries, the second shareholder has no impact. This 
negative impact of a second reference shareholder is consistent with the 
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result for PROP2. Coherently with hypothesis 5, the proportion of equity 
owned by the second shareholder (PROP2) is positively related to the 
firm’s performance in the civil law countries and has no significant effect 
in the common law environment.  
The joint analysis of OWNDUM2 and PROP2 emphasizes the 
importance of the second shareholder and his dual role in the control of the 
firm: the existence of a second shareholder (as introduced by OWNDUM2) 
originates a conflicting relationship between the two largest shareholders. 
Yet, simultaneously, the stake of the second reference shareholder 
(PROP2) is an incentive to deter the extraction of private benefits by the 
largest shareholder.  
This asymmetric behaviour of the second shareholder has much to do 
with the prevalent conflict of interests in the civil law firms, that is, the 
relation between large and small shareholders. This conflict has two 
implications. On the one hand, ownership structures with several 
shareholders could be detrimental for the firm’s performance. In a firm 
with a sole owner, he bears all the costs of extracting private benefits and 
hence has incentives to improve the firm’s performance. If there was a 
second significant shareholder (OWNDUM2), whatever their percentage of 
ownership, a conflict would arise between shareholders and hence the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour and the free-rider actions. 
Consequently, the existence of more than one shareholder has a negative 
influence on corporate performance because conflicts between the 
controlling owners of the firm will inevitably arise. In the same vein, the 
presence of a second blockholder allows controlling coalitions with lower 
stakes to be formed. This could stimulate blockhoders’ expropriating 
actions as the controlling coalition internalizes a lower proportion of the 
expropriating costs and thus, could negatively impact on the firm’s 
performance. 
Now, once the divergence of interests between shareholders is taken 
for granted, as a second implication, balanced ownership structures become 
a way to minimize such costs and the largest shareholder faces more 
internal contestation. This largest shareholder needs the consent of the 
second shareholder to pursue his own interests in detriment of small 
shareholders. In this case, the higher the ownership of the second 
shareholder, the more difficult will it be for the main participant to 
expropriate from the other small shareholders. Therefore, the role of the 
second shareholder is twofold: the fact that equity is not totally owned by a 
sole shareholder has a negative influence on the value of the firm; but once 
this issue is accepted, the control of the main shareholder turns out to be 
easier as long as the second shareholder holds a higher stake on corporate 
ownership. 
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As provisional inferences, our results confirm four out of the five 
hypotheses and stress the different conflicts of interest within firms in 
different legal and institutional settings. In the common law system, the 
most prominent conflict involves managers and shareholders and both 
managerial ownership and capital structure work as mechanisms to control 
managerial discretional decisions. On the contrary, in civil law countries, 
the main agency problem arises between dominant and minority 
shareholders and, therefore, the ownership structure and the role played by 
a possible second reference shareholder become vital to improving the 
firm’s performance. Given the critical importance of ownership structure 
and the lack of empirical support to hypothesis 3 (the effect of ownership 
concentration), we shall perform an additional analysis whose results are 
reported in Table 6. 
(Insert Table 6) 
Table 6 displays the results of dividing the sample according to the 
existence of a second significant shareholder10. These results can alleviate 
the above conflicting empirical evidence. In civil law countries, ownership 
concentration has an outstanding and twofold effect. When there is no 
second shareholder, ownership concentration combines a negative 
influence on corporate value (PROP1) with a positive effect (PROP12). In 
other words, lower levels of ownership concentration facilitate the 
expropriation of small shareholders by the largest shareholder. However, 
for high enough levels of ownership concentration, the largest shareholder 
bears most of the costs and, therefore, the cost of expropriation overcomes 
private benefits and reduces managerial incentives to expropriate.11 In 
addition, when there is a second reference shareholder, his ability to control 
the main shareholder becomes quite influential and, consequently, rather 
than PROP1, the most significant variable is PROP2, an indicator of the 
internal contestability to the largest shareholder.  
However, the possible expropriation of small shareholders by the 
largest shareholders is not such a relevant problem in the Anglo-Saxon 
context. In fact, as hypothesized, the proportion of shares owned by the 
largest shareholder is not significant. In those countries, the most effective 
mechanisms are corporate debt and managerial ownership –those most 
closely related to managerial discretion. These results corroborate the 
different implications of the legal origin of each country for corporate 
governance and underline the internal contestability as an outstanding issue 
in civil law firms. 
We perform some tests of robustness for our results. First, we have run 
new estimations with another dependent variable. Instead of MB, we have 
defined EMB as the equity market-to-book ratio. This variable has been 
used in the literature to test the impact of financial decisions on a firm’s 
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value (McConnell and Servaes, 1995). Results are reported in column (1) in 
Table 7 and, broadly speaking, are consistent with previous ones. The most 
outstanding results are the dual role of managerial ownership and of the 
second shareholder in each institutional setting. Managers’ stake shows a 
non-linear relation with the value of the firm (combining the alignment and 
the entrenchment effect) in the common law countries. In the civil law 
firms, the presence of a second reference shareholder has a negative impact 
on firms’ performance but, simultaneously, the stake owned by the second 
shareholder improves the performance of the firm. 
(Insert Table 7) 
Another test of robustness focuses on the stake of the possible 
controlling coalition. We define a possible controlling coalition as the sum 
of the two largest shareholders. The underlying intuition is that, the higher 
the stake of the controlling coalition, the larger the proportion of the 
expropriating costs that the coalition internalizes. Therefore, we have 
defined PROP1&2 as the sum of the ownership held by the two largest 
shareholders. The results of the new estimation are reported in column (2) 
in Table 7 and provide interesting insights. 
As expected, corporate debt and managerial ownership are the most 
effective mechanisms of control in the common law firms. On the contrary, 
in civil law firms we should emphasize the influence of the second 
shareholder and that of the controlling coalition. PROP1&2 shows a non-
linear relation with the firm’s performance: positive for low levels and 
negative for the highest levels of ownership. This result corroborates the U-
shaped influence of ownership concentration and the vital role of the costs 
of expropriation. When the controlling coalition has a lower stake, both 
large shareholders can extract private benefits without bearing most of the 
costs. After a certain threshold of ownership, the internalized costs of 
expropriation increases so much that they deter the expropriating behaviour 
of the shareholders that form the controlling coalition and, thus, the firm’s 
performance increases. 
Some additional models have been run whose results are not reported 
for brevity but which are fully consistent with previous ones12. We have 
interacted financial leverage and ownership concentration with the legal 
and institutional framework as a way to check to what extent the capital 
structure and the ownership structure are substitutes contingent on the type 
of country. The results show that financial leverage is complementary to 
managerial ownership for common law countries while the monitoring of 
the second shareholder is a substitute for other mechanisms in civil law 
countries. We have also introduced a non-linear specification for leverage. 
Its aim is to control for a possible trade-off in civil law firms between the 
disciplinary role and the bankruptcy costs of debt. The estimated 
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coefficients are not significant and, therefore, do not support this intuition. 
The results confirm the asymmetric role of the control mechanisms and the 
outstanding importance of the second reference shareholder. 
5. Concluding remarks 
As the law and finance approach has pointed out in the international 
corporate governance arena, the agency problems are shaped by investors’ 
legal protection. Thus, while in common law countries the main corporate 
conflict arises between firm owners and the managers who are supposed to 
run the firm in shareholders’ benefit; in civil law countries, the most 
prominent conflict appears between majority dominant and minority 
shareholders. In this dual framework, we study the functioning of the 
mechanisms of corporate governance –more specifically, capital structure 
and ownership structure- conditional on the legal tradition of the country.  
Our results highlight the differential role played by the control 
mechanisms depending on the legal and institutional setting. The greater 
separation of ownership and control in common law countries implies that 
corporate debt can act as an instrument for managers’ discipline and has a 
positive impact on the firm’s value. Likewise, in these firms managerial 
ownership is an effective control mechanism with two different effects: an 
alignment effect for low levels of managerial ownership and an 
entrenchment effect for high enough managerial ownership. 
In contrast, in civil law firms, capital structure and managerial 
ownership have no significant influence on the firm’s value. In these 
countries, higher ownership concentration facilitates the expropriation of 
wealth from small shareholders by the large dominant shareholders. Our 
results lend support to a non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance, so that the largest shareholders extract 
private benefits for low levels of ownership up to a point where the costs of 
expropriation exceed the private benefits.  
Nevertheless, the key aspect of our paper is the power sharing inside 
the firm and the contestability of the largest shareholder. Unlike the lack of 
incentives to monitor from a too diluted ownership structure, and the 
excessive discretion of a dominant unchecked controlling shareholder, our 
results stress the outstanding role played by the controlling coalition. 
Consistent with previous research, we find that the existence of a second 
significant shareholder and his ownership can act as effective 
counterbalancing factors to monitor the leading shareholder. On the one 
hand, the existence of a second reference shareholder may trigger a conflict 
among the significant shareholders and, consequently, reduce firm 
performance. On the other hand, by owning a higher stake this second 
shareholder may control the extraction of private benefits by the largest 
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shareholder, so the ownership of the second shareholder becomes 
positively related to the firm’s value. 
There are several implications from our research, but the sharing of 
control in firms arises as the most outstanding13. Given the growing 
importance of the conflict of interests between majority dominant 
shareholders and minority shareholders in most Continental European 
countries, policy makers should foster stable ownership structures with 
multiple large shareholders. Since each of these shareholders holds fewer 
shares than those necessary for control, they need to interact and to share 
power among themselves by forming controlling coalitions. This shared 
control protects minority shareholders while preserving valuable private 
benefits of control. Consequently, the ability of large shareholders to 
contest the largest shareholder should be encouraged. This suggests a kind 
of trade-off between preventing the controlling shareholders from harming 
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1 We understand as “second reference shareholder” a blockholder, i.e., a shareholder other than the largest 
one, who holds at least 5% of the shares. 
2 This expression refers to the problems of collective action arising when the benefits of one agent’s 
actions are distributed among other agents who neither take part in the action nor share in the costs 
involved. 
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3 This assertion could be affected by the ownership structure. For example, banks, that are good at 
monitoring, diminish the agency problem between managers and shareholders. 
4 Such expropriation could be the transference of assets and profits outside the company in favour of the 
majority shareholders: sales of assets, contracts in favour of other companies under their control, 
appropriation of assets in cash, hiring people with family connections, etc. 
5 AMADEUS is a product of Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing and provides standardized annual 
accounts for companies throughout Europe.  
6 Endogeneity might appear when ownership structure, financial leverage or dividends are affected by 
firms’ peformance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2003; Himmelberg et al., 1999, De Miguel et al., 2004). 
 
7 Although the results are not presented for brevity, the total proportion of ownership held by the largest, 
the two, three, four and five largest shareholders is always higher in the civil law countries with a 
confidence level above 99%. 
8 VIF= 1/(1- Ri2). 
9 According to our data, this critical threshold is situated at a level of around 25% of director ownership. 
10 This pattern is only followed for civil law firms since, in the common law environment, the ownership 
dispersion makes the number of firms with a second reference shareholder insignificant. 
11 According to our data, this critical threshold is situated at a level of around 80% of the largest 
shareholder’s ownership. 
12 All of them are available from the authors upon request. 
13 Another interesting analysis could be that of multinational firms operating in different legal 
environments in order to know which kind of agency problems they are affected by the most. 
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Table 1: Composition of the sample by countries 
Civil-law origin: 755 firms, 1708 observations 
French origin Companies Observations German origin Companies Observations 
France 270 547 Germany 146 345 
Spain 57 141 Austria 18 42 
Holland 72 204 Total 164 387 
Belgium 36 75    
Greece 29 62 Scandinavian origin   
Italy 2 6 Denmark 39 110 
Luxemburg 1 3 Sweden 53 93 
Portugal 4 11 Finland 28 69 
Total 471 1,049 Total 120 272 
Common-law origin: 461 firms, 1407 observations 
Great Britain 460 1,403    
Ireland 1 4    
Total 461 1,407    
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main variables  
Mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum value of the variables. MB is the 
market to book ratio of assets; PROP1 and PROP2 the proportion of ownership of the 
largest and the second largest shareholder; DIR the proportion of managerial ownership; 
LEV the financial leverage ratio, DIV the dividend payout ratio and LOGAST the log of total 
assets. The p-value is the maximum level of significance to reject the null hypothesis of 
equality of means between both sub-samples. 
   Mean   Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Variable    Common  Civil   Total p-value     
MB  3.154 2.864 2.99 0.006 1.860 3.238 21.65 0.007 
PROP1  0.185 0.416 0.31 0.000 0.230 0.242 1.000 0.001 
PROP2  0.088 0.127 0.11 0.000 0.086 0.094 0.500 0.000 
DIR  0.079 0.105 0.09 0.000 0.000 0.192 1.000 0.000 
LEV  1.486 2.287 1.92 0.000 1.395 1.851 17.97 0.000 
LOGAST  2.657 2.153 2.49 0.000  2.292 0.861 5.398 0.070 
DIV  0.072 0.032 0.050 0.000  0.037 0.081 1.386 0.000 
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Table 3:  Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
Pearson’s correlations between variables and VIF (variance inflation factor) to test the 
absence of multicollinearity. The minimum value of VIF is 1. MB is the market to book ratio 
of assets; PROP1 and PROP2 the proportion of ownership of the largest and the second 
largest shareholders; DIR the proportion of managerial ownership; LEV the financial 
leverage ratio, DIV the dividend payout ratio and LOGAST the log of total assets. 
Variables MB LEV PROP1 DIR PROP2 DIV LOGAST 
MB 1.000       
LEV 0.095 1.000      
PROP1 -0.025 0.138 1.000     
DIR 0.031 -0.034 0.235 1.000    
PROP2 0.001 0.093 0.174 0.123 1.000   
DIV 0.211 0.008 -0.151 -0.077 -0.099 1.000  
LOGAST 0.022 0.236 -0.011 -0.239 0.015 -0.003 1.000 




Table 4. Ownership structure and ratio of value 
Number of observations according to the ownership held by the two largest shareholders 
and mean value of MB in each group. We consider reference shareholders to be those 
owning at least 5% of firm’s equity. PROP1 measures the proportion of the largest 
shareholder and PROP2 the proportion owned by the second largest shareholder 
Panel A: civil-law companies No. obs MB  
Prop1 ≤  50% 961 2.79 
Prop1+ Prop2 ≤  50% 644 2.67 
Prop1+ Prop2 > 50% 317 3.03 
Panel B: common-law companies No. obs MB  
Prop1 ≤  50% 1311 3.15 
Prop1+ Prop2 ≤  50% 1228 3.12 
Prop1+ Prop2 > 50% 83 3.48 
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Table 5: Results of the estimation 
Coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of the GMM estimation of model [1]. MB is the 
market to book ratio of assets; PROP1 and PROP2 the proportion of ownership of the 
largest and the second largest shareholders; DIR the proportion of managerial ownership; 
LEV the financial leverage ratio, DIV the dividend payout ratio, LOGAST the log of total 
assets and OWNDUM2 a dummy variable if the company has a reference second 
shareholder. The Hansen test is informative of the validity of instruments. It follows a χ2 
distribution (degrees of freedom in brackets) and auto(2) is a test for the absence of second 
order serial correlation. *** for 99% confidence level, ** for 95% and * for 90%. 
Variable Civil  Common  
LEV 0.093  1.564 **
 (0.255)  (0.779)  
DIR 10.159  17.479 **
 (23.447)  (7.786)  
DIR2 25.711  -32.417 *
 (38.623)  (13.835)  
PROP1 -15.676  6.881  
 
(10.905)  (7.705)  
PROP12 5.031  -3.927  
 (11.474)  (8.626)  
OWNDUM2 -21.224 *** 0.225  
 (5.980) (4.000)  
PROP2 41.207 *** -6.638  
 
(13.433)  (5.850)  
LOGAST 1.666 ** -0.531  
 (0.689)  (0.457)  
DIV 59.499 *** 110.23 ***
 (12.080)  (18.940)  
No. obs. 1708  1407  
Hansen test (d.f.) 40.19 (46)  29.87 (45)  
Auto(2)  0.43  0.69  
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Table 6: Results of the estimation 
Coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of the GMM estimation of model [1]. MB is the 
market to book ratio of assets; PROP1 and PROP2 the proportion of ownership of the 
largest and the second largest shareholders; DIR the proportion of managerial ownership; 
LEV the financial leverage ratio, DIV the dividend payout ratio, LOGAST the log of total 
assets and OWNDUM2 a dummy variable if the company has a reference second 
shareholder. The Hansen test is informative of the validity of instruments. It follows a χ2 
distribution (degrees of freedom in brackets) and auto(2) is a test for the absence of second 







  Without 2nd S/H  With 2nd S/H  With 2nd S/H  
LEV  0.283  -0.009  1.634 **
  (0.268)  (0.084)  (0.729)  
DIR  1.754  -0.019  21.988 ***
  (15.384)  (3.563)  (7.642)  
DIR2  16.355  1.567  -42.447 ***
  (24.505)  (6.006)  (13.782)  
PROP1  -60.825 ** -2.518  1.451  
  (25.180)  (2.850)  (7.240)  
PROP12  36.988 ** 0.714  2.536  
  (19.046)  (2.990)  (7.192)  
PROP2   3.405 * -7.247  
   (1.920)  (6.045)  
LOGAST  -1.437  0.134  -0.619  
  (1.227)  (0.117)  (0.450)  
DIV  11.330 * 3.590 *** 98.558 ***
  (6.091)  (0.313)  (16.887)  
No. obs.  306  1402  1388  
Hansen test (d.f.)  18.89 (25)  39.47 (36)  29.27 (46)  
Auto(2)  -1.39  -1.23  0.49  
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Table 7: Robustness analysis 
Coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of the GMM estimation of model [1]. The 
dependent variable is a proxy of Tobin’s q, the equity market-to-book ratio in column (1) and 
the market-to-book ratio of assets MB in column (2). PROP1 and PROP2 the proportion of 
ownership of the largest and the second largest shareholders; DIR the proportion of 
managerial ownership; LEV the financial leverage ratio, DIV the dividend payout ratio, 
LOGAST the log of total assets and OWNDUM2 a dummy variable if the company has a 
reference second shareholder. The Hansen test is informative of the validity of instruments. 
It follows a χ2 distribution (degrees of freedom in brackets) and auto(2) is a test for the 
absence of second order serial correlation. *** for 99%,, ** for 95% and * for 90%. confidence 
level 
  (1)    (2)   
Variable Civil  Common  Civil  Common  
LEV 5.574 *** 13.981 *** -0.195  0.910 **
 (1.192)  (1.609)  (0.223)  (0.378)  
DIR 13.432  105.34 ** 8.829  9.205 *
 (46.593)  (50.602)  (8.901)  (4.977)  
DIR2 25.753  -179.28 ** 9.477  -16.010 *
 (68.941)  (88.889)  (15.067)  (9.547)  
PROP1 -83.819  -49.534     
 
(71.919)  (61.303)  
   
PROP12 62.501  85.176     
 (68.763)  (91.632)     
OWNDUM2 -48.560 ** -232.83 **    
 (20.809) (114.39)    
PROP2 154.71 ** 9.295     
 
(65.961)  (9.649)  
   
PROP1&2    -20.158 *** -0.725  
    
(4.970)  (8.055)  
PROP1&22    20.752 *** -2.724  
    
(4.028)  (9.010)  
LOGAST 4.898  -0.530  1.028  -1.393  
 (3.352)  (1.910)  (0.223)
 (0.933)  
DIV 28.781  10.049 *** 4.889 *** 2.687  
 (17.919)  (10.718)  (1.337)  (5.241)  
No. obs. 1708  1407  1708  1407  
Hansen test (d.f.) 22.44 (26)   32.12 (26)  44.91 (37)   48.00 (46)  
Auto(2)  0.52  -1.55   0.86  -0.65  
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